This paper offers a comparative overview of the case studies included in this Special Issue with the aim of providing a narrative of how the refugee emergency in Europe has unfolded during the period 2014-2016. I look at the 'real' events as they happened, identify which events were taken up in the different national political scenes and media landscape as highly relevant, and then identify on the basis of a meta-analysis of the findings of the different papers, the main interpretative frames used to make sense of the refugee emergency. This meta-analysis allows me also to relate the discourses with the actual policies adopted or decisions taken with a view to addressing the emergency. The paper focuses on contrasted discourses, how they are politicised in different countries and how they are eventually brought together adopting a frame of 'reason'/rationalisation that reconciles solidarity with public order.
the southern and south-eastern corner of Europe, notably Greece and Italy, as well as the transit countries along the Balkan route, notably Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. In Central Europe we have included Poland as the most extreme case of a country where the crisis was a matter of heated debates despite no actual lived experience thereof (hardly any immigrants or refugees entered the Polish territory). We also looked at Austria, one of the major recipients of asylum seekers heading north where a culture of welcoming supported by civil society and left wing parties shifted to an attitude of exclusion after specific events in the fall and winter of 2015. The study is complemented by an analysis of (social) media and political discourses in Germany and Sweden, two of the major final destination countries (together with Austria) in northern Europe, and also the UK -a reluctant host of a few thousands of refugees. The discourses (re-)contextualise and represent these events in a variety of ways. Attention is paid in this paper to check whether some crisis events had a wider, transnational resonance and provoked shifts in coverage and/or political arguments such as, for instance, was hypothesised with regard to the tragic death of little Aylan Kurdi, his brother and their mother who drowned outside the Turkish coast on 5 September 2015 seeking to cross to Greece.
The papers included in this special issue share a critical discourse analytic perspective which shows how different events have been represented by different media in different countries, using sometimes opposed strategies of legitimation while calling to the same values. Thus, for some, compassion and solidarity involves keeping the refugees in Syria and its neighbourhood with adequate care and money, so as to prevent them from losing their lives on their way to Europe while for others it means providing them sanctuary in the EU. In some countries their earlier experiences of seeking refuge from civil war or ethnic violence symbolised their duty to help the people fleeing the Syrian conflict, while in other countries these historical experiences were used precisely to highlight differences and reject responsibility. National discourses were internally diversified as different political parties and civil society actors adopted opposed viewpoints. Naturally a common element that surfaces in the papers included in this Special Issue is the relevance of domestic Refugee crisis 3 politics, upcoming national or regional elections and the Left and Right wing dimension as well as the ways right-wing populist and radical right parties instrumentalised this situation (e.g. Wodak 2015).
My aim in this comparative overview is to pull these different threads together and to provide a narrative of how the crisis has unfolded -the 'real' events as they happened, identify which events were taken up in the different national political scenes and media landscape as highly relevant, and then identify on the basis of a meta-analysis of the findings of the different papers, the main interpretative frames used to make sense of the refugee emergency. Such meta-analysis is necessary as I do not have access to the primary data that are in different languages, and of different discourse genres. This meta-analysis allows me also to relate the discourses with the actual policies adopted or decisions taken with a view to addressing the emergency.
A note of style is in order here -I am using interchangeably the terms 'refugee crisis' and 'refugee emergency' to speak of the massive asylum seeker and irregular migration flows that Europe has witnessed during the period 2014-2016. I realise that the term refugee crisis is contested by many civil society actors but it allows us to refer to this set of events in a concise way. In addition it is my view that this was a multiple 'crisis': a crisis in terms of unprecedented volume and pace of refugee and migrant flows but also a crisis in terms of the receiving countries' asylum reception policies. A crisis for EU politics and policies as it brought to the fore the divergent views of different member states. Last but not least, it was a positive 'crisis' to the extent that it triggered a dramatic wave of solidarity and voluntary help by citizens and non-governmental organisations and later a dramatic rise of suspicion and 'asylum panic' (for a critical discussion on the policy responses see: Triandafyllidou & Mantanika, 2017) .
The section that follows offers an overview of the flows and main events during the period analysed, notably between early 2015 and mid 2016. Section three turns to the comparative analysis Refugee crisis 4 of the discourses. Last but not least the final section highlights how the politicisation and mediatisation of crisis events in Europe today is taking a new turn.
A Crisis Unfolding
According to UNHCR data, there were 1,015,018 arrivals by sea to Europe through the Mediterranean, during 2015, with 61 per cent originating the journey from the world's top-refugee producing countries, notably Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan. Most of these arrivals were recorded at the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea -at the Greek-Turkish border (Eastern Mediterranean route), with a smaller number at the Italian coasts (in Sicily and Lampedusa, the (Central Mediterranean route).
As the situation in Syria and the neighbourhood has been deteriorating since 2013 and the emergence of the ISIS, refugee flows towards Europe started increasing dramatically not only to neighbouring countries in the region and Turkey but also via Turkey to Greece and Italy seeking to travel further north to other European countries. At the same time as conflict and violence persisted in places like Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, and Yemen, as well as Nigeria, flows from both East and West Africa increased as well. The event that marked a new period in the Mediterranean refugee emergency was a deadly shipwreck with over 250 victims south of Lampedusa in September 2013.
Following such massive loss of human lives, the Italian government decided to implement a big Search and Rescue operation, labelled Mare Nostrum, which involved sending military ships to patrol near Libya with the aim of saving small boats in distress. Thus, the year 2014 turned out to be a crisis year for Italy with significant irregular migration and asylum seeking flows via Libya (and a total number of arrivals standing at 170,000). The opposition parties accused the Italian government for creating a call effect through the Mare Nostrum operation, as migrant smugglers hurried to overload unworthy dinghies with tens or hundreds of people, reassuring them that once at sea they call the international emergency number and would soon be rescued by the Italian navy.
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In the fall 2014, Italy sought EU solidarity to cover for the costs of Mare Nostrum (which amounted to 11 million Euro per month), and hence a decision was taken at EU level to downsize and transform it into a European operation named Triton, whose budget and mandate were however significantly narrower. Migration and asylum seeking pressures across the Central and Eastern Mediterranean continued, particularly from Syria, leading to a change in smuggling strategies from then onwards. Old large commercial vessels were loaded outside the port of Mersin in SouthWestern Turkey and sailed all the way to southern Italy. This trend lasted for a few months in late 2014/early 2015 while at the same time Greece experienced also a notable increase in flows, mostly of Syrians, from Turkey to the Aegean islands.
In spring 2015 it became apparent that a massive asylum seeking and perhaps also irregular migration emergency was developing as the pathways re-activated by Syrians from Turkey to Rheindorf & Wodak, this issue). Despite criticisms by other member states, Austria went on to put a cap to asylum seeking applications for 2016 that would be not more than 37,500.
Another important EU policy development during spring 2015 was the launch of the "hotspot approach" 1 established both in Greece and Italy. This was introduced by the EU Commission in its proposal for a European Agenda on Migration 2 and can be summarised as identification, registration, and fingerprinting of incoming migrants as procedures that take place in specific camps at the borders. In Greece, there are five hotspots operating on the islands to screen and channel newcomers to the adequate procedures. In Italy, there are four hotspots operating in the area of Sicily and southern Italy. However, the 'opening of the Balkan route' in fall 2015 limited their role to simple registration centres that would allow people to move to Athens and the Greek mainland and continue their journey across the Greek-FYROM border. The papers included in this Special Issue cover media and political discourses that refer to 2015-2016. As the above short overview of the migrant/refugee flows' evolution and related policy developments has shown, there were several turning points where actions and discourses of both national and EU authorities were influenced by the massive and (then) continuing character of the flows and the lack of effective means to tame them. These responses in policy and political actions soon entailed various subsequent "discursive shifts" (Krzyżanowski, 2013; Special Issue) and policy changes, and effectively led to policies/actions becoming legitimised by political and mediated discourses (Zhao & Djonov. 2017).
There was clearly a shift from seeking to manage and to channel the flows distributing responsibility through quotas in spring and fall of 2015, to the construction of the refugee flows as an effective emergency, a crisis that called for more drastic measures. These policy developments were obviously in an interactive relationship with developing media and political discourses as well as civil society mobilisations around the refugee crisis. Contributions to this special issue focus on the mediatisation of the refugee flows, notably the representation of the flows and of the specific events that took place in the summer, fall and winter 2015 and in early 2016) in the media -both the traditional mass media (Press, television) and social media (notably Twitter) which are used by parties and governments as direct channels for defending their decisions. They also however examine the politicisation of the issue, notably the way in which the refugee flows and the related policy challenges have been intertwined with national party-political discourses and their internal political competition in each country. We clearly see these different factors as inter-related in the (re)production of the political and media discourse on the refugee emergency.
Media and political debates as (re)produced in media, in speeches, in Twitter posts, were nationally and regionally contextualised in relation to the positioning of each country as a frontline or final destination, as directly or peripherally involved; and also historically and politically contextualised in terms of past experiences of seeking or offering refuge and hosting migrants (or lack thereof), and in relation to current challenges including Euro-scepticism (see contributions to this Special Issue).
The landscape thus of the overall politicisation and mediatisation of the crisis has been complex and with overlapping contextualisations and intertextualisations. My aim in this concluding paper is to highlight how the actual flow of events compares with the importance each event is given in the different national media and political landscapes, and also to identify the common interpretive frames that are shared across the countries under study.
Turning points of a shared European story-line
Contributions in this Special Issue cover different sections of the wider period during which the refugee emergency has been unfolding, notably between the early 2015 and the Spring 2016, while most papers concentrate on the peak times in the period between July 2015 and January 2016.
Naturally the choice of the specific periods to be covered pertains to the authors and their contextual judgement on which was a really crucial period during which the politicisation and mediatisation strategies adopted by political leaders and the media can be analysed and when public discourse accelerated (see Table 1 for an overview).
Table 1 Here
Connecting the methodological choices of contributors to this Special Issue to the actual evolution of events (see our overview in the previous section) allows us to identify how each set of national media and/or national political leaders 'hooked' upon a specific event that is nationally relevant, along a longer shared story-line of the refugee emergency. As earlier research has shown, international crisis events are debated by national media in different ways that resonate with national discourses while also intertwining with common European discursive elements (Triandafyllidou, Wodak, & Krzyzanowski, 2009 ).
We can re-tell the story-line of the refugee emergency through the nationally important This is a major event that organises the coverage in Austria and Germany even if later the discourse shifts away from hospitality and openness.
Refugee crisis
13
The fifth event is the Cologne incidents on New Year's Eve: a number of young women celebrating New Year's Eve in the main Cologne square in Germany are assaulted by groups of young men looking foreign (dark skin, dark hair, looking 'Arab') who steal their cell phones and wallets and also abuse them. While there is no confirmation that the perpetrators are asylum seekers, the first testimonies and media representations signal that some of them could be part of the recent arrivals. These events on New Year's Eve in Cologne signal a turning point -a recontextualisation of the refugee emergency in terms of body politics, the emergence of a 'sexual nationalism' where the nation, the homeland, or Europe is represented as a young and innocent woman assaulted by these foreign, evil men.
The Cologne incidents are tightly linked to the eventual closure of the Austrian borders and subsequent closure of the Balkan route -which both have important resonances with the Austrian and German debates. They become however important for Greece too as they not only create an additional emergency -people are stranded in Greece, just before the Greek-FYROM border in the North but force also Greece to take a stance. And while the Greek government refuses to close its border with Turkey upholding its obligation to offer asylum, it has to come to terms with the dilemma and the pressure, simultaneously being threatened with expulsion from the Schengen treaty. These two related events, the closure of the Austrian borders and the subsequent complete closure of the Balkan route become thus matters that represent more widely the belonging to the European Union.
The papers in this Special Issue highlight how these shared important events are reinterpreted within each national public sphere with a view of defining what is really at stake for each country and how it should be dealt with. Having reviewed the analysis provided in each paper, the section below identifies on the basis of meta-analysis of the specific findings on each country the two main interpretive frames (Snow et al. 1986; Triandafyllidou & Fotiou, 1998; Verloo, 2005) that define in the different countries what is at stake and what should be done about it. While the different papers adopt different methodologies and tools for analysis, they all belong to the wider critical discourse analysis perspective and thus allow us to use their findings for a critical analysis of relevant interpretive frames.
Interpretative frames: what is at stake and what should be done about it
While usually frame analysis (Snow et al. 1986; Verloo, 2005 ) is adopted on the basis of the primary media or other (e.g. policy) textual materials, I am proposing here to use it for the metaanalysis of the findings of the specific case studies included in this volume. The reason is that while the coverage offered is comprehensive and wide, it would be impossible to analyse the primary materials through a common dataset or coding scheme and method given the fact that they exist in different languages and cover different genres of discourse (from Twitter messages to long parliamentary speeches). However, there are some findings that clearly emerge in terms of what is
at stake, what is the suggested course of action to address the issue and who is to blame.
As the paper by Vollmer on Germany aptly epitomises in this special issue, the 'refugee emergency' is defined by a representation of people on the move. The flows that are massive and desperate. References to small boats unworthy of sailing at high seas, images of people being rescued from the sea but also of dead corpses, become typical images and references that construct the emergency. As Colombo with her paper on Italy rightly stresses in this special issue, what has been an emergency for already a couple of years is transformed into a crisis, both at the discursive level but also at the level of factual information (thus proving that it 'becomes' crisis only once sufficient conditions of both politicisation and mediatisation are in place, see Introduction to this Special Issue). The representation of the refugee emergency soon moves on and from dinghies passes to people marching, walking across borders, travelling from Greece, through FYROM, Serbia and Hungary (or later through Serbia to Slovenia) and moving on to Austria and Germany, with their feet. Occasionally also by train and bus taking routes that were hitherto forgotten local connections among petty traders or families in the region -routes that had no major economic or political significance in the post-1989 period.
Alongside these actual effects of hundreds of thousands of people moving across the TurkeyGreece corridor and the Balkan route up west and north, the emergency is defined also by a legal fact: the Dublin Regulation that establishes the first safe country principle (asylum applications must be treated at the first safe country where the person arrives, in this case it would have been Greece) is de facto interrupted. Governments and border guards only acknowledge this exceptional situation. They do not seem to fight against it even if several measures are taken at the EU level already since spring 2015 in the effort to manage the mounting flows of asylum seekers from the Middle East and elsewhere. These two sets of events -an actual event of people travelling by boat and on foot, and the legal 'events' -the disruption of border controls, the de facto interruption of the Dublin regulation and also the disruption of the Schengen area regulations which foresee that controls are strict at the external EU borders as people then enter a no-internal-border zone set the scene for the refugee emergency and make it into a common, Europe-wide public issue. It is worth noting that parallel international organisations like the Interntional Organisation for Migration (IOM) step in in producing knowledge on the crisis. The IOM establishes a new data centre in Berlin, the GDAC-IOM, with the main aim of assembling and producing data on all migration and refugee crisis but particularly on what is labelled 'the Mediterranean crisis.' Thus the crisis comes into being also at the level of governance.
The challenge is high for the frontline countries like Greece and Italy but also for the transit countries in the Balkans and the final destination countries particularly Austria, Germany and Sweden that start receiving an extraordinary number of people applying for asylum in their territory. Two competing interpretive frames emerge to discuss the emergency: the moralisation frame and the threat frame.
Moral Responsibility/Solidarity vs Threat/Exclusion
The first is a moralising frame which puts the responsibility of the flows to wars, conflict, and violence in the regions of origin. The people moving are seen as victims, they are almost represented as deprived of agency. It is the flow that moves (see the paper by Vezovnik on the Slovenian media coverage, in this special issue) and is directed north, not the single individuals. Thus values also become a criterion of European-ness, turning the argument on its head.
In Austria and in Germany the frame is further reinforced by notions of deservingness;
territorial borders are thus contextualised as morality borders too. These people deserve protection because they are fleeing war. This framing is replicated in Poland albeit in a clearly negative tone:
the asylum seekers are not deserving of solidarity and protection because they are bogus refugees, in reality they are economic migrants. Interestingly it is only public intellectuals as analysed in the paper on Croatia and Serbia that offer a reflection on World War II, persecution and providing refuge -arguing that Europe must not forget and must uphold its solidarity and humanitarianism values.
The second interpretive frame identified across media and political speeches in the countries under study is the frame of 'Threat'. The asylum seeker flows are like a natural disaster -they are fall upon one unexpectedly. They cannot be managed and are unpredictable. This frame is strong in Poland and Slovenia in particularly but is also present in the UK and Austria as the emergency unfolds and the flows continue unabated. The 'jungle' in Calais as the symbol of 'threat', going out of control and even health risks is mobilised in the British Twitter discourses analysed by Bennett in this Special Issue.
The threat frame is a common frame mobilised often in today's globalised and interconnected 'risk' society (Beck, 2001) . In Poland and Slovenia specific risks for public health from unknown -now forgotten in Europe -diseases and the inability of health services to cope.
The strategy of personification ("Us" versus "Them") is used in this frame to clearly oppose "us" -the natives, the Europeans -to "them" -the migrants, the newcomers, the non-deserving ones. In the frontline countries like Italy and Greece 'them' is also Europe -which has left them to deal with the emergency, without sufficient solidarity or support. In Poland, the "Us versus Them" strategy is adopted not only to emphasise Poles versus 'western Europeans' but also to juxtapose
Poland from Sweden (look how they have become, they have sharia law in many provincesbecause they did not protect their borders) as well as Germany (the Germans are responsible for these large migrant flows).
In conclusion, the threat frame mobilises both feelings of uncertainty and divisions within
Europe. By contrast to the moralisation frame which refers to shared European values and to a common representation of us and them together, in solidarity and even empathy, the threat frame uses opposition to argue that this is a 'zero sum' game: what migrants / refugees 'achieve' comes at the expense of the natives who welcome them.
Rationalisation: Reconciling Solidarity with Order
While one might expect that there are simply two competing representations of the refugee progressively builds his argument from one of 'if there is not sufficient capacity to host the refugees, we will create it' to subscribing to the argument that it is 'irresponsible' to accept so many people, eventually concluding in January 2016, that Austria can only accept 37,500 new asylum seekers per year and once this number is reached, it will close its borders. The upper limit is justified through an interpretive frame of rationality, distancing thus the debate from moral arguments about human rights while also however refusing to endorse the threat frame. In both countries concerns about retaining votes play an important part. Faymann seeks to remedy the bad results at the regional election while Renzi seeks to keep the allegiance of those voters who start worrying about Italy showing 'too much' solidarity.
In a similar vein, the Swedish Social Democrat party and its leader conclude 'we are a small country and have done enormously a lot' hence while we uphold our principles and tradition of human rights and providing asylum, we have to limit the number of people we can accept and hence we have to close our borders.
Interestingly this frame is also adopted in the UK, which has hardly received a high number Rationalisation is an interpretive frame that avoids left wing versus right wing tensions. It thus eventually solves the big moral and political dilemma of Europe allowing political leaders and the media to present political and policy decisions as both true to the European values of humanitarianism, solidarity, asylum but also taming the influx of newcomers that are feared to drain resources and destabilise social cohesion. Assistance must be provided but while making sure that security and order prevail and the rights of 'natives' are not impaired by the dynamic immigration/refugee situation.
Concluding Remarks
This Democrat and other centre-left or left wing parties and media adopt the moralisation frame upholding notions of solidarity and providing protection despite the massive character of the flows, while right wing and far right wing politicians in particular adopt an interpretive frame of threat and risk, using this frame to create divisions within Europe and to juxtapose their nation to the asylum seekers/migrants, but also to other European countries.
However this political tension and disagreement is eventually solved by the mobilisation of the rationality interpretive frame. Both the partisans of risk and closure, and the supporters of solidarity and humanitarianism, can agree on the need for being rational, practical, and able to manage the emergency. While for those supporting the risk frame, the rationalisation frame comes in as the way to avert risks and seal off the borders -this is what it means being rational and efficient, for those supporting the morality and values frame, rationalisation means being responsible and effective.
Thus taming solidarity and empathy with the notion of responsibility and order. Eventually solidarity and order are reconciled, allowing for parties and the media to argue that they were not betraying the European values but clarifying that in order to stay true to those values and implement them properly, there is a need for closure and re-establishing control and order. This interpretative and yet in others to accuse the government for not taking action (as in the case of the opposition leader in Greece, see Dimitrakopoulou & Boukala in this Special Issue) . This is an issue that would require further research, notably on how frames may be both used to foreground decisions and 'solutions' while they may also be used to legitimise ex post the course of action chosen. 
